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Abstract
We describe a simple approach to peer-to-peer electronic mail that would allow users of ordinary
workstations and mobile devices to exchange messages without relying upon third-party mail server
operators. Crucially, the system allows participants to establish and use multiple unlinked identities
for communication with each other. The architecture leverages ordinary SMTP [1] for message
delivery and Tor [2] for peer-to-peer communication. The design offers a robust, unintrusive method
to use self-certifying Tor onion service names to bootstrap a web of trust based on public keys for end-
to-end authentication and encryption, which in turn can be used to facilitate message delivery when
the sender and recipient are not online simultaneously. We show how the system can interoperate
with existing email systems and paradigms, allowing users to hold messages that others can retrieve
via IMAP [3] or to operate as a relay between system participants and external email users. Finally,
we show how it is possible to use a gossip protocol to implement mailing lists and how distributed
ledger technology might be used to bootstrap consensus about shared knowledge among list members.
1 Objectives
Third-party e-mail platforms operate control points that can, and often do, function against the interests
and purposes of their users and the other e-mail users with whom their users correspond. However, the
convenience offered by such platforms, coupled with the architecture of carrier networks and the mobility
of user devices, typically prevents individual users from operating their own mail servers. In particular,
many broadband and mobile carriers implement firewalls, either explicitly or de facto via network address
translation, to block packets destined for servers operated by their clients. Carriers without such policies
often assign their users dynamic addresses, rendering them unreachable as a means of receiving mail
and untrusted by remote servers as a means of sending mail. As a result, although server software can
certainly run on mobile devices such as laptops and phones, few users actually run such software, and
platform operators such as Apple and Google have little incentive to promote a departure from this
paradigm.
Tor onion services [4] offer an accepted way for users to reach each other directly. The operator of
an onion service reaches out through the Tor network to establish a point of presence that other users
can access over an end-to-end encrypted channel using a self-certifying name. Although the Tor relays,
including the introduction and rendezvous points, facilitate the end-to-end connection between the Tor
client and the onion service, they have no knowledge of the identities of the clients and services that
they are connecting. Tor software runs on most mobile devices, and mail servers can be compiled to run
on most mobile devices as well. It is therefore entirely possible for mobile devices such as phones and
tablets, in addition to ordinary laptops and workstations, to run a combination of software utilities that
can underpin a peer-to-peer e-mail network, and a package containing such utilities can be designed to
interoperate with popular mail clients with minimal modification.
Next, we define the specific goals of our project, which we believe will increase the value of e-mail to
its users and promote trust in the infrastructure that delivers it:
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1. Require end-to-end encryption between users. Although popular mail servers tout their use of client-
to-server encryption as well as server-to-server authentication via SPF [5] and DKIM [6], ordinary
customers of popular e-mail platforms still do not generally use end-to-end encryption technology.
In contrast, our system would leverage peer-to-peer trust to provide real, usable security for its
users.
2. Eliminate third-party mail server operators. Electronic mail generally relies on network carriers
to deliver messages from the source to the destination. If the sender and recipient are online
simultaneously, then they can leverage anonymity networks to communicate without third-party
mail servers to collect metadata about their conversations. Even when the sender and recipient
are not online at the same time, there is no reason that these carriers must be giant platforms. In
contrast, our system would leverage peer-to-peer relationships to deliver messages.
3. Support multiple unlinkable identities per user. Most people use a small number of distinct email
addresses to receive mail from a large number of different users. As a result, they implicitly create
linkages among their many relationships that can be observed by third parties. Our system natively
supports the establishment of an arbitrary number of unlinkable identities for each user. By not
providing a way for an individual to prove that two identities are linked, we reduce the chance that
linkages will be forcibly discovered by an adversary.
2 Comparison to Other Projects
Anonymous, web-based e-mail accounts are already available on the Internet. Unfortunately, such e-mail
accounts are generally incompatible with ordinary mail client software and business processes, and they
usually have few features and service-level assurances. They also rely upon third-party operators, who
might block access or simply stop working at any time, thus resisting the establishment of long-term
identities or addresses. So we need something different. There are a few notable projects that put the
users in the center of the architecture; we compare our system to theirs in terms of requirements:
1. Mixminion, a “Type III Anonymous Remailer” [7]. Mixminion uses mix networks to batch, mix,
and resend anonymous e-mail messages through a network of remailers. Mixminion extends the
Mixmaster [8] protocol in several ways, notably by introducing reply blocks to facilitate secure
replies to an anonymous sender. Mixminion is designed to tolerate high latency, so theoretically its
anonymity properties could be better than Tor, which is designed for low-latency applications and
therefore introduces a vulnerability to timing attacks. Although Mixminion has been released, it
has not been under active development since 2013, and its developers do not recommend its use [9].
In contrast, our system is explicitly designed for low-latency operation, in part because we believe
users do not want to wait for their mail, and in part because the Tor anonymity network delivers a
much larger anonymity set that has already been bootstrapped. Additionally, although our system
can be used to send and receive anonymous e-mail messages, we do not anticipate that will be its
typical use case. We imagine that in most circumstances the senders and recipients will know who
each other are. Nevertheless, the system relies upon the anonymity of the Tor network to protect
users from network adversaries and to ensure that the application itself is not blocked.
2. Cwtch, an “Infrastructure for Asynchronous, Decentralized, Multi-Party, and Metadata Resistant
Applications” [10]. Cwtch is an extension of the Ricochet [11] protocol, which provides real-time
instant messaging using Tor onion services. Cwtch extends Ricochet by allowing asynchronous
group messaging. In contrast, despite the fact that our proposal anticipates low latency, our system
is not principally intended for real-time instant messaging. We assume that typical messages can
be lengthy, with rich features and attached files, and we assume that typical users will want to read
each one individually and at their convenience. We further assume that users will often be offline
when communication takes place, as they would for ordinary e-mail. For all of these reasons, our
system does not use Ricochet and instead relies upon ordinary SMTP for passing messages.
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From: Alice <user@wxu6pped7wv3.onion>
To: Bob <user@0xiq82snnr09.onion>
Message: ...
Alice Bob
Figure 1: If Alice runs a mail client and server on her device and Bob does the same, then Alice can
send mail directly to Bob using Tor onion services. The channel from Alice’s Tor client to Bob’s Tor
client is protected by end-to-end encryption.
3 System Requirements
We imagine that a user of our proposed system will have access to the Internet and a device that can
accommodate Tor client software, an SMTP client, and an SMTP server. Nearly all modern workstations
and laptops running Linux, Windows, MacOS, or a BSD derivative will satisfy the device requirement.
Smartphones and tablets will usually satisfy this requirement as well, although users are advised that,
depending on the specific restrictions imposed by their device vendors, they might need to install a
custom operating system to install the requisite software applications.
The Tor client software must be configured to allow a helper application to operate persistent Tor
onion services via the Tor Control Protocol [12]. The user shall also have compliant e-mail software,
including a modified mail server that can accommodate the behaviour defined in this document. The
user should also have a modified mail client that can facilitate the behaviour defined in this document.
Depending upon how the server is implemented, such modifications might not be strictly required,
although we imagine that appropriate client modifications could significantly improve the user experience
and value of this system. The user should also have suitable PGP software [13]; we assume this will be
OpenPGP [14].
4 System Design Overview
The elemental feature of our design is pairwise communication between two parties via SMTP over Tor,
wherein each user operates at least one (and probably more than one) Tor onion service that relays
traffic to an SMTP server, as illustrated by Figure 1. The SMTP servers are not generally intended to
be available outside the Tor network, and that therefore the system does not rely upon Tor exit relays
for its operation. Most Tor exit relays disallow traffic exiting to common TCP ports used for SMTP
anyway, although this is not a concern for the system we describe.
4.1 Personal Introductions
Before they can send mail to each other via our system, the users will need to have received the in-system
e-mail addresses of their counterparties. This can be accomplished in several ways:
1. Manually added by the user.
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From: Bob <user@0xiq82snnr09.onion>
To: Alice <user@wxu6pped7wv3.onion>
Message: Carol <user@2gqisa2z13oj.onion>
Bob Alice
From: Alice <user@wxu6pped7wv3.onion>
To: Carol <user@2gqisa2z13oj.onion>
Message: ...
Alice Carol
Figure 2: Bob can introduce Alice to Carol by including contact details for Carol in a message to
Alice. Then Alice can send a message to Carol directly. The combination of Bob’s introduction and the
self-certifying Onion address form the basis for trusting Carol.
(a) One-to-one messaging via an external channel. Of course, it is possible for a community
to share such addresses with each other by exchanging files over any other digital medium,
including regular messaging with servers to support e-mail or chat.
(b) Via a web page or message board. Web pages or message boards could advertise e-mail
addresses for use within this system.
(c) In person. This could be done with near-field communication or QR-code scanning by a mobile
device. The QR-code scanning could be device-to-device, or it could involve a device scanning
a posted or printed advertisement.
2. Automatically added via communication within the system.
(a) In-system introductions. Once two counterparties know how to reach each other, they can
introduce each other to third parties, as illustrated in Figure 2.
(b) Mailing lists. One user can invite another to participate in a mailing list by sharing the name
of the list and agreeing to forward list messages in one or both directions. For example, Bob
can agree to forward messages from Alice to the list, or from the list to Alice, or both; we
describe mailing lists in Section 4.4.
4.2 Message Delivery
Once two parties are able to communicate with each other using our protocol, then they can rely upon Tor
to ensure that the channel over the network between them is encrypted. However, the use of Tor onion
services does not automatically ensure that their applications can verify the authenticity of messages,
and indeed there is no specific protection for the message between the endpoint of the Tor service and
the recipient’s mail client. This is important for two reasons. First, most mail clients assume that mail
is persistent, not ephemeral, and OpenPGP [14], the established mechanism for exchanging end-to-end
encrypted messages, would operate outside the security envelope of Tor. Second, users might want third-
parties to carry messages for them, a desideratum that is particularly important when the recipient is
not online at the time that the sender sends the message.
To address this concern, we specify a mechanism by which two parties can mutually exchange their
OpenPGP keys [14], relying upon the security envelope provided by Tor to ensure that the message is
not intercepted by network adversaries. Once the users have exchanged their GPG keys in this manner,
they can exchange messages that are end-to-end encrypted and suitable for persistent storage, as shown
in Figure 3.
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From: Alice <user@wxu6pped7wv3.onion>
To: Carol <user@2gqisa2z13oj.onion>
GPG Key Request
From: Carol <user@2gqisa2z13oj.onion>
To: Alice <user@wxu6pped7wv3.onion>
GPG Key Response: 0k4jnr1l701a
Alice Carol
From: Alice <user@wxu6pped7wv3.onion>
To: Carol <user@2gqisa2z13oj.onion>
For: Carol <user@2gqisa2z13oj.onion>
Message: [...] encrypted to 0k4jnr1l701a
Alice Carol
E
Figure 3: Once Alice knows how to reach Carol, she can request Carol’s GPG key. This step can
be implemented automatically via the headers of messages that Alice and Carol send to each other, for
example using reply blocks. With Carol’s GPG key, Alice can send encrypted messages to Carol that can be
stored and forwarded if required. (Note: the padlock with the ‘E’ symbol on the envelope indicates that the
message is encrypted from Alice’s message-writing application to Carol’s message-reading application.)
From: Alice <user@wxu6pped7wv3.onion>
To: Bob <user@0xiq82snnr09.onion>
For: Carol <user@2gqisa2z13oj.onion>
Message: [...] encrypted to 0k4jnr1l701a
Alice Bob
E
From: Alice <user@wxu6pped7wv3.onion>
To: Carol <user@2gqisa2z13oj.onion>
For: Carol <user@2gqisa2z13oj.onion>
Message: [...] encrypted to 0k4jnr1l701a
Bob Carol
E
Figure 4: Message Carriers. If Carol is not online when Alice tries to send a message, then Alice
can encrypt the message with Carol’s GPG key and send it to Bob, whose software can subsequently try
to send the message to Carol on behalf of Alice, even if Alice goes offline. Note that SMTP explicitly
recommends a way for Bob to periodically resend the message until it succeeds.
Bob <user@0xiq82snnr09.onion>
Carol <user@2gqisa2z13oj.onion>
via Bob <user@0xiq82snnr09.onion>
GPG Key: 0k4jnr1l701a
Alice
Address Book
Figure 5: Address Book Function. It is assumed that Alice’s mail client will maintain a mapping
that includes metadata such as the provenance of the introduction, designated carriers of messages, and
public cryptographic keys for each contact.
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From: Alice <user@wxu6pped7wv3.onion>
To: David <david@0xiq82snnr09.onion>
Message: ...
Alice Bob
IMAP
From: Alice <user@wxu6pped7wv3.onion>
To: David <david@0xiq82snnr09.onion>
Message: ...
Bob David
Figure 6: Accounts. If desired, Bob can also handle mail for David directly. In this setup, Alice sends
mail to Bob’s device, and David pulls it from Bob via IMAP (via Tor, or not).
Users who are able to send end-to-end encrypted messages can also rely upon carriers to forward
messages on their behalf, as shown in Figure 4. This feature is useful when the recipient is not online
at the time that a message is sent; in such circumstances we propose that a third party can relay the
message at the behest of the sender, thus addressing the availability problem that mail servers intend to
solve. Carriers using SMTP will be able to perform best-effort delivery just as an ordinary mail server
would. We assume that users will exchange information about carriers that they mutually trust for this
purpose; trust will still be needed even whilst the messages are encrypted, since carriers might fail to
forward the messages. We assume that users will keep track of GPG keys and lists of trusted carriers
in local address books, as shown in Figure 5. In particular, one particular user might keep track of the
specific user responsible for the introduction to a third user, and the set of introductions to the same
user can form the basis of a list of designated carriers. We assume that a user can send messages via
multiple carriers at the same time, and perhaps also attempt direct contact with the recipient similarly,
and that the recipient’s software will be able to delete or track any duplicate messages. We assume that
carriers will also be able to inform senders that a message was sent successfully, although end-to-end
delivery confirmation can be handled by established SMTP headers [15].
4.3 Accounts and Forwarding
Users of this messaging system can provide services to communicate with others who might not run their
own mail server software. For example, a user of the system can provide an account for someone who
might or might not be a user of the system, as shown in Figure 6. Mail for the external user (David, in
our example) that is received by the carrier (Bob, in our example) can be stored in an account on the
carrier’s device. Then, the external user can access the account via an ordinary mail-access protocol such
as IMAP [3], which can be offered to the external user as a Tor onion service. (It would also be possible
for the carrier to offer the account to the external user without using a Tor onion service, although this
might not work if the carrier is behind a firewall or NAT.)
Users of this messaging system can also exchange messages with others who have external e-mail
accounts, as shown in Figure 7. In this case, messages for external users (David, in the example) would
be sent to the carrier (Bob, in the example) with a special tag specifying the external user to which
the message must be forwarded. Then, the SMTP server running on the carrier’s device will create
a new message containing the contents of the original message and send it via ordinary SMTP to the
external user. To facilitate replies, the new message will provide an address for the sender consisting of
a username encoding the in-system e-mail address of the sender and a hostname corresponding to the
externally reachable address of the carrier’s mail server.
6
From: Alice <user@wxu6pped7wv3.onion>
To: Bob <user@0xiq82snnr09.onion>
For: David <david@googlemail.com>
Message: ...
Alice Bob
ordinary SMTP
From: Alice
<user-wxu6pped7wv3@bobsmail.net>
To: David <david@googlemail.com>
Message: ...
Bob David
Figure 7: External Forwarding. If desired, Bob can deliver mail to David at an external address.
In this setup, Alice sends mail to Bob’s device, and Bob forwards it to David via ordinary SMTP. Later,
when David wants to reply to Alice, he is provided an address for Alice that instructs Bob’s mail server
to forward it appropriately.
4.4 Mailing Lists
Finally, the system can be used to implement decentralised mailing lists that do not rely upon a mailing
list server. Such mailing lists would rely upon pairwise relationships among list members. We assume
that each participant in a mailing list will have exchanged OpenPGP keys and agreed to receive messages
from at least one of the other participants. We further assume that the graph formed by those pairwise
connections is fully connected. Then, a gossip protocol can be used to share messages through the entire
network and, as long as all participants remain connected and continue to share messages, every message
will eventually reach every user.
Figure 8 illustrates how a message would be sent and propagated among a set of list participants. List
members would propagate a message through the network link by link, each member receiving messages
from one of its neighbours and passing it to its other neighbours, discarding any duplicates. We assume
that a message received by a list member would be signed by the original author and that the entire
message and the signature by its original author would be countersigned by the neighbour from which it
was directly received. Then, the list member can decide whether to propagate the message based upon
its policy and the validity of the signatures.
It is possible to use a distributed ledger to help ensure the completeness of the list conversation. For
example, a list could require that each message includes a hash of the previous message, and that an
invalid hash would cause a message to be rejected for propagation by policy. It is also possible to use a
distributed ledger to keep track of the consensus state of something on behalf of the entire group. For
example, a distributed ledger could be used to track and serialise the changes to a document, a record
of transactions of tokens, or a series of calculations.
5 Security Considerations
The following is a partial list of security considerations that are important to the design of systems that
make use of the protocol described in this document:
1. Identity revocation. In the absence of a centralised authority or revocation server, users will need
to share revocation announcements with their peers.
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From: Alice <user@wxu6pped7wv3.onion>
To: Mailing List XYZ
<list-xyz@0xiq82snnr09.onion>
Message: [...]
signed by Alice (c2mx4chcyf59)
Alice Bob
S
From: Alice <user@wxu6pped7wv3.onion>
To: Mailing List XYZ
<list-xyz@2gqisa2z13oj.onion>
Message: [...]
signed by Alice (c2mx4chcyf59)
countersigned by Bob (g495k17w89xi)
Bob Carol
S
Figure 8: Mailing Lists Mailing lists can be implemented using a gossip protocol among a set of
pairwise-linked network list participants. Members shall forward messages to each other and break cycles
by rejecting duplicates. Rate-limiting and filtering rules can be implemented by individual list members
using the signature on the message. Members can also authenticate message carriers by requiring each
message sent to a list to be countersigned by the peer that forwarded the message. It is possible to use
a distributed ledger to establish consensus about the set of messages that have been sent to the list, the
sequence of the messages, or the agreed-upon state of a system based upon the aggregation of the messages.
(Note: the padlock with the ‘S’ symbol indicates that a message is signed.)
2. Managing multiple devices. Users could copy their Tor onion service keys and their OpenPGP keys
to multiple devices, although it is the responsibility of the user to ensure that only one Tor onion
service is active at a given time for a given Tor onion service key.
3. Attacks to link multiple identities for a user. Users should be careful to control the set of parties
with whom they share their addresses, in case they want to establish different identities and ensure
that they stay unlinked. Also, adversaries could employ timing attacks to statistically link different
identities that simultaneously operate on the same device.
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